A growing literature seeks to understand how the characteristics of …rms shape the manner in which they serve foreign markets. We consider an environment in which multiproduct …rms can sell their products in multiple countries from multiple product locations. We show that there are strong empirical regularities in the expansion strategies of U.S. multinational …rms and that simple extensions of standard models do not explain these regularities. We augment these models by introducing a framework in which managerial expertise is a scarce input that has to be allocated to particular products and production locations and show that the standard model, so amended, is consistent with the data. We then use the model to analyze the productivity e¤ect of changes in international frictions both within and across …rms.
Introduction
The world's largest …rms are incredibly complex organizations that sprawl across industries and countries. For instance, according to its annual report, Dupont operated production facilities in over 70 countries and produced a wide range of goods such as food, motor vehicle parts, electronics, plastics, construction materials, and industrial chemicals. In organizing the global activities of their …rms, management must make a wide range of interrelated decisions: Which goods should they produce? Where should their focus lie? Where should it produce each good and
The statistical analysis of …rm-level data on U.S. multinational corporations reported in this study was conducted at U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis under arrangements that maintained legal con…dentiality requirements. Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily re ‡ect those of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
for which markets? Standard models within the international trade literature typically deal with only a subset of a …rm's activities and may miss important interactions between decisions.
This paper begins with a descriptive empirical analysis that establishes new facts from a con…dential …rm-level dataset for U.S. multinationals. This dataset allows us to link the domestic and export activity of the U.S. parent …rms of U.S. multinationals to the activity of their foreign a¢ liates. We show that many large U.S. …rms sell to una¢ liated customers in a given foreign market simultaneously through exports from the United States and through locally based a¢ liates. We interpret this fact as evidence that these …rms opt to export a subset of their products and produce a di¤erent subset abroad. Further, we show that the breakdown of these sales by exports versus multinational production can be predicted by looking at the domestic operations of the parent …rms. While parent …rms with large sales in the U.S. markets have both larger export and foreign a¢ liate sales, the ratio of exports to a¢ liate sales rises in the domestic market share of parent …rm. We also show that parent …rms that concentrate the bulk of their domestic activities in a few product categories tend to expand abroad using foreign a¢ liates rather than exports. These results suggest a need to understand the interaction between a parent …rm's choice of the number of products to manage and the choice between mode (exports versus multinational production) that will be used to deliver these products to foreign customers.
To understand the forces at work in the data, we introduce a simple model in which …rms produce multiple products for multiple countries in multiple locations. As in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011) …rms may produce goods in a continuum of industries. We extend this setting to allow …rms to tradeo¤ local production in foreign countries for export from the home country. As in Brainard (1993 Brainard ( , 1997 , Horstmann and Markusen (1992) , and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) …rms face a proximity-concentration tradeo¤ in choosing between these two modes of serving foreign markets.
We model …rm heterogeneity in a very di¤erent way than standard treatments in the tradition of Melitz (2003) . Production e¢ ciency for any particular good requires managerial expertise, which is in …xed supply within the …rm. Increasing productivity of some goods (or equivalently in our framework, raising quality) comes at the expense of productivity improvements in other goods. Firms are heterogeneous in two features of managerial expertise. First, management teams vary in their endowments of expertise. Firms with greater expertise have an absolute advantage producing in all goods for all countries. Second, manage-ment teams di¤er in the relative e¢ ciency with which they can deliver expertise to foreign a¢ liates, which creates a comparative advantage in producing at home or abroad.
Our model has interesting implications for the geographic structure of production. Firms with larger endowments of managerial expertise have higher aggregate sales in domestic markets, higher exports, and higher foreign a¢ liate sales. It turns out, however, that variation in absolute endowments of managerial expertise only govern the absolute size of a …rm's global operations and cannot predict the relative importance of exports versus a¢ liate sales. This is inconsistent with the empirical facts as demonstrated in the empirical section of the paper. Hence, a model based strictly on absolute advantage (i.e. strictly higher levels of aggregate productivity) cannot explain the composition of international commerce within the …rm.
We show that it is the second source of …rm heterogeneity in our model that can create the empirical link between small, concentrated parents and highly multinational operations. As one would expect, …rms that have a comparative advantage in applying managerial expertise abroad tend to sell to foreign customers relatively more through a foreign a¢ liate rather than through exporting. However, because producing in multiple locations consumes managerial expertise, there is less managerial expertise that can be used to manage marginal product lines in the home market, leading the parent …rm to be narrower and smaller than otherwise. In this sense, a comparative advantage in foreign operations reduces the absolute quantity of managerial resources deployed in the home market.
Finally, we use the model to analyze the impact of trade and MP frictions on the allocation of resources within the …rm. We show that a reduction in trade costs induces the export oriented …rms to increase the productivity of their export goods at the expense of other goods in their portfolio. Less export-oriented …rms increase the productivity of all of their product lines. A reduction in the …xed cost of investing abroad leads the most MP-oriented …rms to expand the range of goods produced abroad which ultimately leads to a reduction in managerial resources available for any given plant. Less MP-oriented …rms shrink their product portfolio which has the implication of increasing the productivity of their remaining products.
This paper contributes to a broad range of the literature in International Economics. Most distinctively, it blends the elements of the literature on multiproduct …rms with elements of the literature on multinational …rms. Its treatment of multiproduct …rms as having a heterogeneous portfolio of productivities across products makes it similar to Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011) 1 and Arkolakis and Muendler (2011). In its focus on the span of control across product lines within the …rm, the paper is similar to Nocke and Yeaple (2006) who treat product lines within the …rm as symmetric. In a sense, the model presented in the paper blends elements of these two models. These papers, and all of the multiproduct …rm papers in the literature of which we are aware, analyze an environment in which …rms are not free to locate production overseas. 2 With respect to the treatment of multinational production, this paper belongs in the branch of the literature that focuses on a proximityconcentration framework that has been associated with Horstmann and Markusen (1992) , Brainard (1993 Brainard ( , 1997 , and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) . In focusing on communication problems between managers located in one country and a¢ liates in another, the paper also has antecedents in Keller and Yeaple (2011) .
The key contribution of this paper is to focus attention on the role of scarce managerial expertise within the …rm and its a¤ect on both product range and the expansion strategies of multinational …rm. There is now a growing and vibrant literature on management practices and their e¤ect on industry and country performance as typi…ed by Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenan (2012).
By focusing on scarce managerial expertise and multinational …rms, our paper has some outward similarity to Burstein and Monge (2008) , who also treat management as a rival factor within the …rm but who do not address multiproduct …rms and who analyze the use of scarce managerial resources in a vertical FDI framework. 3 Outside of the international economics context, the idea that there is a …xed stock of expertise within the …rm that can be applied across products can also be found in Matsusaka (2001) and Phillips and Maksimovic (2002) whose focus is on the understanding diversi…cation in conglomerates. Finally, in separate work Agapitos and Yeaple (2012) analyze multiproduct, multinational …rms in an environment in which the organization of international product of a …rm is due to the interaction of …rm characteristics when a …rm's products are close substitutes to one another.
The remainder of this paper is broken into three main sections. The next section describes a dimension of the data on multinational …rms that has received less attention in the international trade literature: the …rm-level composition of sales broken down by parent sales in the home market, parent exports by country, and a¢ liate sales by host country. We establish a number of interesting empirical regularities. Section three speci…es and analyzes a simple extension of a popular multiproduct …rm model in the trade literature to allow for multinational production and endogenous productivity through the allocation of scarce managerial resources. In section four, the equilibrium of the model is characterized with a focus on the mapping of a …rm's characteristics to its domestic and international operations. We show that a model in the tradition of Helpman et al (2004) naturally extended along the lines of Bernard et al (2011) cannot reproduce key elements of the facts presented in section two and show that introducing a span of control is critical to matching the qualitative features of the data. In section …ve, we present comparative statics results. Here our focus is on the e¤ects of a reduction in trade and MP frictions a¤ects the allocation of scarce managerial resources across product lines within the …rm. We show that the nature of this reallocation depends on the …rms' inherent characteristics with some …rms becoming more productive and others less so. The …nal section summarizes and concludes.
Features of Multiproduct Multinationals
In this section, we uncover several as yet unknown or underappreciated features of the international expansion strategies of multinational …rms. First, we show that large multinational …rms are very likely to both export to and engage in local production for una¢ liate customers in a given foreign market. The most natural interpretation of the phenomenon is that …rms sell multiple products and individual products are sold exclusively by one mode or another. 4 Second, we show that …rms with large U.S. market shares and diverse product portfolios disproportionately sell in foreign markets via exports from the United States rather from local a¢ liates. The fact that smaller, highly focused …rms are more likely to engage in multinational operation is not a prediction of the standard models. We argue that this feature of the data highlights the need to incorporate management capabilities into trade theory.
Data Description
Firm-level data of the international structure of U.S. multinationals'operations come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, which are conducted for the purpose of producing aggregate statistics on direct investment activities for the general public. 5 A U.S. multinational entity is the combination of a single U.S. legal entity that has made the direct investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign a¢ liate. As a result of con…dentiality assurances and penalties for non-compliance, the BEA believes that coverage in this survey is close to complete and the level of accuracy is high.
For reasons of data availability, we rely on the 1994 benchmark survey of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 6 We are interested in the manner in which U.S. …rms serve una¢ liated customers in foreign markets; by exporting from the U.S. parent or by selling to these customers from a local a¢ liate. While every benchmark survey collected detailed …rm-level data by country on the value of sales of the foreign a¢ liates to una¢ liated customers in their host country markets, …rm-level data on parent …rm exports to those countries is scarce. The last year that the BEA collected comprehensive data on the exports of parents to una¢ liated customers by destination country was 1994. 7 We also collect data on the scale and scope of the parent …rms operations in the United States that are geared toward serving the U.S. market. We observe a parent …rm's sales to U.S. customers in the aggregate across all categories of goods, the number of three-digit manufacturing industries in which the parent is active, and the value of sales of each of these types of goods. 8 From these data, we can infer a …rm's U.S. scope (the number of product categories), its scale (average U.S. sales per industrial category), and a Her…ndahl index of the concentration 5 U.S. direct investment abroad is de…ned as the direct or indirect ownership or control of a single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. 6 For information on the survey, see the Methodology section of the data publication U.S. Direct Investment Abraod:
1994 Benchmark Survey, Final Results, which can be accessed on the BEA's web site at http://www.bea.gov/scb/account_articles/international/usdia94.htm. 7 Data collection on this variable was gradually phased out after 1994. In 1999, the reporting threshold was raised substantially so that smaller parents need not report. After 1999, this part of the survey was eliminated. 8 In the 1994 benchmark survey, the BEA asked …rms to report their top eight industries, so there are likely a number of …rms for which this restriction binds. of sales across product lines. We focus on U.S. …rms whose main-lineof-business is manufacturing and count only the product classi…cations that correspond to manufacturing industries. The parent …rm's export data is aggregated across all product classi…cations but is disaggregated by …nal destination. Only exports in excess of $500,000 are reported. To these sales, we also include a¢ liate imports of goods classi…ed for resale without further processing.
For each parent …rm, we observe their network of foreign a¢ liates by country and industry. Our measure of a¢ liate activity by …rm and country is the sales of manufacturing a¢ liates to una¢ liated customers in their host country. In cases in which the same …rm owned more than one manufacturing a¢ liate, we aggregated over a¢ liates to create a single …rm-country observation.
Descriptive statistics for our sample are reported in Table 1 . There are 725 parent …rms in our sample. These …rms tend to be very large as shown in their average U.S. sales of $1.7 billion. Moreover, they tend to be active in more than one product classi…cation. The average parent …rm exports to 11 countries and owns a¢ liates in 3.4 countries, so exports are the more common mode in terms of destinations served. The volume of sales by mode is very di¤erent, as the average export by country is only $2.4 million while the average a¢ liate sales by country is $97 million. Note that both types of sales are highly skewed, which is why we consider a log-log speci…cation below. Further, while …rms tend to export to a larger number of countries than they engage in a¢ liate sales, a¢ liate sales in the aggregate account for 57% of total foreign sales, and when measured across countries 77 percent. The bulk of …rms engage in both exports and a¢ liate sales to una¢ liated customers in at least one country. Firms that only engage in a¢ liate sales tend to have substantially smaller parent sales than …rms that engage in both. Table 2 reports the results of our simple regression analysis. Columns 1, 2, and 3 correspond to dependent variables that are (1) the logarithm of a …rm's foreign a¢ liate to local customers, (2) the logarithm of the parents exports to una¢ liated local customers, and (3) the logarithm of the share of a¢ liate sales in total …rm sales. The rows correspond to the explanatory variables. The …rst row corresponds to the logarithm of the parent …rm's sales in the United States. The remaining four rows correspond to standard gravity controls: log GDP, log GDP per capita, log distance from the United States, and an indicator variable for English as the o¢ cial language. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the results of replacing the country characteristics with country …xed e¤ects.
Empirical Analysis
We begin by discussing the results for the levels of sales by each mode. Looking across the …rst row, we see that larger parents sell larger quantities to any given foreign country whether through their foreign a¢ liates (columns 1 and 4) or by exporting from the United States (columns 2 and 5). The coe¢ cients on parent sales in the United States are highly statistically signi…cant using standard errors that have been corrected for heteroskedascity and for clustering at the …rm level. Further, the results in columns 1 and 2 show that gravity …ts quite well at the …rm level for both a¢ liate sales and for parent exports, although there are di¤erences in the relative sizes of the coe¢ cient estimates. Note the larger number of observations for the export speci…cation demonstrates that parents are more likely to export to any given location than they are to open an a¢ liate there.
In columns 3 and 6, the coe¢ cient estimates associated with a dependent variable that is the ratio of a¢ liate sales to total …rm sales in a given foreign market. The coe¢ cient is negative and highly statistically signi…cant, indicating that while larger parents have larger a¢ liate sales and larger export sales to a given market, larger parent …rms rely relatively more heavily on export sales to a given market than on a¢ liate sales. As our interest is on the coe¢ cients on parent …rm variables, we henceforth focus exclusively on country …xed-e¤ect regressions.
In Table 3 , we further explore the relationship between parent …rm local market behavior and the …rm's foreign market behavior. In column 1 parent sales are decomposed into scale (logarithm of U.S. sales per product) and scope (logarithm of number of products). The results indicate that both outcome variables for the parent …rm predict the …rm's foreign expansion strategies: high scale or high scope is associated with larger exports relative to a¢ liate sales. In column 2, we add two additional parent …rm characteristics, the logarithm of their R&D intensity and the logarithm of their capital to labor ratio. We …nd that although capital intensity does predict higher a¢ liate sales (perhaps because of a greater likelihood of internalization?) adding these additional parent …rm characteristics only raises the coe¢ cient on scope.
In column three of Table 3 , we add a measure of concentration at the level of the parent …rm: ie the sum of squared product category shares by …rm. An increase in this variable, which represents a more concentrated …rm, is associated with an increase in the relative importance of a¢ liate sales in the expansion strategies of …rms. Note that adding this variable makes the coe¢ cient on scope change sign and to become not statistically signi…cant. In the last column of Table 3 , we drop product scope and scale and add back our measure of parent sales in the United States. The coe¢ cient estimates are consistent with our previous results: parents that are smaller and more highly focused on a narrow product range tend to expand relatively more through foreign a¢ liates than larger and more highly diversi…ed parents.
We have run a number of robustness checks through which the essential message of Tables 2 and 3 remains intact. These include Heckman selection speci…cations using World Bank measures of business costs as an exclusion restriction and …xed e¤ects speci…cations for the main-lineof-business. We also consider Tobit speci…cations with an upper limit of zero to account for observations in which only a¢ liate sales are observed. The e¤ects are to increase the absolute values of the estimated coe¢ cients, but not their sign or statistical signi…cance.
Model Assumptions
To allow for …rms to produce and sell their product in multiple locations we consider a world in which there are two identical countries indexed by l and k. The preferences of the representative consumer in each country are two tier over a continuum of goods that are each di¤erentiated by variety. Preferences over these goods are Cobb-Douglas with equal budget shares:
Each industry is di¤erentiated by variety with subutility function given by
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across individual varieties. For expositional convenience, we assume that the elasticity of substitution is common across goods i. All goods are produced using exclusively labor, which we choose as the numeraire, and an input we will refer to as managerial expertise. There exists a continuum of ex ante identical entrepreneurs. When an entrepreneur incurs a …xed cost F E , she receives a bundle of characteristics from distributions known ex ante. First, she receives the blueprint to produce one variety of each type of good. Each blueprint implies a level of "fundamental" productivity Z independently drawn from a Pareto distribution G(Z) = 1 Z ; where > 1. As all …rms draw from the same distribution, there is no aggregate variation across …rms due to this source of heterogeneity.
The actual productivity with which the …rm will produce a product of fundamental productivity Z depends as well on the quantity of "managerial expertise" that is dedicated by the …rm to the plant producing that variety. If t j (Z) is the quantity of this managerial input allocated to a plant at location j that produces a variety of fundamental productivity Z then the productivity of that plant is
where e 2 (0; 1= ( 1)) is a measure of the span of control of managerial expertise by product. By location j 2 fd; f g, domestic and foreign is relative to the country that the …rm entered. If a …rm entered in l is producing in k = l then j = d whereas if k 6 = l then j = f .
When a …rm enters it also receives a random draw that de…nes its managerial type, which is the source of intrinsic aggregate heterogeneity across …rms. This types includes the …rm's stock of managerial expertise, T , and the e¢ ciencies of this expertise in its home market (d) and in the other market (f ) given by ( d ; f ). These characteristics are drawn from a joint probability distribution H with density h.
Equation (3) shows that productivity is endogenous and depends on the amount of managerial expertise that the entrepreneur allocates to its production. In allocating time to the various goods produced by the …rm, the manager must respect the constraint that she can allocate no more than T units of her managerial expertise to all goods that are produced:
where t j (Z) is the expertise allocated to a plant of productivity Z that is located in country j 2 fd; f g. Note the role played by the parameter j . We assume that f = d = 1 so that a …rm has greater di¢ culty coordinating production in remote locations. We normalize the communication cost in domestic markets to unity because it can be safely subsumed into absolute managerial expertise T and assume that the support for is on 1; . 10 Aside from the idiosyncratic productivity di¤erences across goods within a …rm, all of the heterogeneity across …rms has been neatly bundled into the expertise allocation constraint across …rms as shown in equation (4) .
An active …rm must decide where to produce each good. If a …rm produces a particular variety at home, it must pay a …xed cost F . If it chooses to export that good to the foreign country, it must pay a variable iceberg-type trade cost 1. We will use in our exposition below the transformed, "freeness" of trade parameter 1 < 1. In addition, the …rm must pay a …xed cost F x to …nd a distributor for its product. Finally, the …rm might choose to produce abroad to serve the local market from a local a¢ liate. As is standard in the proximityconcentration literature, by opening the a¢ liate, the producer avoids trade costs but must pay a …xed cost F m . To obtain an interior solution in which all modes will be observed by at least some …rms, we make the following parameter restriction:
The timing of the model proceeds as follows. First, …rms draw their type (T; ) and their good-speci…c productivities. Second, …rms decide which goods to produce, which markets to serve, and where to locate production for each good and market (mode choice). Third, …rms choose how much time to allocate to production of each good at each location. Finally, …rms compete in monopolistically competitive fashion in each market.
In summary, the model extends the simplest version of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011) to a setting in which …rms face a proximityconcentration tradeo¤ between exports and multinational production. While …rms are heterogeneous in their productivity in various good categories, this heterogeneity is entirely idiosyncratic and not the origin of aggregate productivity di¤erences across …rms. Instead, productivity of individual products depend on the characteristics of management that enter the resource constraint (4) . Note that because all …xed costs (aside from the entry …xed cost) are product speci…c. This will have the implication that once a …rm has entered, it will not exit because it can sell at least some goods in all markets. We have purposely chosen to eliminate such selection e¤ects across …rms to focus on selection within …rms.
Results
In this section we characterize the equilibrium choices of heterogeneous …rms as a function of their types (T; ). We solve the model backwards by …rst deriving sales and pro…ts for each good and production location taking as given the allocation of managerial expertise to each product and the production location of that product vis-a-vis the …nal market served. Then, we solve for the optimal allocation of managerial expertise within a given …rm across goods as a function of that good's productivity Z and its production location (domestic or foreign). Next, we solve for the production location of each good. Finally, we impose a free entry condition.
Throughout the exposition of this section, our derivation is entirely from the perspective of a …rm from the country l which has its mirror image in country k 6 = l.
Pro…ts and Sales Volumes
The preference system given by (1) and (2) combined with the symmetry of the model implies the following demand function for any given good in either country:
where p is the price charged in the market, E is aggregate expenditure across all goods and P is the price index for each industry given by
where l is the set of goods available for sales in country l. As is well known, pro…t maximizing …rms facing iso-elastic demand (6) optimally charge a price that is a constant mark-up over marginal cost. For a good of fundamental productivity Z we have
where
if the good is produced in j and sold in j e '(t j (Z);Z) if the good is produced in j and exported (8) Note that a …rm will never produce in a foreign market for sale in the domestic market because doing so would require it to incur both communication costs and shipping costs which is never sensible given the symmetry of the two countries. Note also that we have normalized the wage in the two identical countries to unity. Given the optimal pricing formula, and the cost function, we can derive the pro…ts that accrue to any particular mode of serving global markets. For instance, a …rm that sells a particular good Z only its domestic market faces only the domestic …xed cost F and faces no costs of shipping a good or communicating across borders. Hence, the pro…t associated with a purely domestic mode of operation for a product line with speci…c productivity Z of a type (T; ) can be written
where we have de…ned = e ( 1) < 1, and A is the mark-up adjusted demand level in each country given by
The …rm may also choose to serve foreign markets in addition to its domestic market. If it chooses to export its product, it must incur …xed costs F and F x and it must also incur variable costs on its sales to foreign customers. The resulting pro…t associated with exporting is thus
where we have used 1 to simplify notation. Note that a …rm that exports bene…ts from consolidating the production of that variety in one location, which has the advantage of exploiting economies of scale in the provision of managerial expertise.
A …rm that decides to engage in horizontal FDI, avoids all trade costs, but is now exposed to communication costs associated with its parent. Further, the …rm must incur the higher …xed costs associated with international production given by F m . The resulting pro…t is
This expression makes clear that a signi…cant cost to multinational production vis-a-vis the export mode is the need to use managerial expertise for both the domestic and foreign operation. It also suggests immediately, that the foreign plants of a …rm are likely to be at productivity disadvantage relative to their home country counterparts due to communication cost. This implication that overseas plants are less productive than domestic plants is consistent with some empirical work (see Keller and Yeaple, 2011) . Given the pro…ts associated with each mode in equations (9)- (11), the aggregate pro…ts of a multiproduct, multinational …rm can be written
(12) Sales of any good by a given mode can be computed using equations (6)- (8) . We now turn to the optimal allocation of managerial expertise across goods and locations conditional on the location decisions of the …rm for each variety.
Allocation of Managerial Expertise across Products
Suppose that a …rm has made production location decisions by allocating product lines into three sets, D , X , and M , which are the product-speci…c productivities Z of goods allocated to pure domestic sales, export, and multiplant production, respectively. Goods whose Z is not an element of the union of these sets are not produced by the …rm. Using the pro…t functions by mode (9)-(11), the aggregate pro…t function (12) , and the resource constraint (4), the …rst-order conditions for the optimal choice of the amount of managerial expertise to allocate across various goods then imply
measures the total burden of the …rm's production network on its stock of managerial expertise. Equations (13) and (14) illustrate some of the tradeo¤s facing …rms. First, everything else equal, a …rm that expands the number of goods that it manages will have less managerial resources to spend on each good that it produces and so will tend to be less productive (higher B). Second, the managerial resource allocation decision of …rms will magnify di¤erences in the initial productivities across products produced within the …rm. Third, a …rm that reallocates a product from an export mode to a multinational production mode will spend less managerial resources on the foreign a¢ liate than it did in the exporting plant in the home country but may spend more managerial time on the product line in total because it needs to support two, rather than one, plant.
Given the optimal allocation of managerial resources across products, we can now rewrite the pro…ts by mode from the system (9)- (11) as
We now focus our attention to the manner in which …rms assign various goods in their portfolio to various modes of serving global markets.
Allocation of Goods to Modes
Pro…ts per mode are given by the equations in (15) . Given this formulation, we can use the logic in Helpman et al (2004) to assign products to modes. From the assumptions (5), it follows from the expressions in (15) that there exist cuto¤s z D and z X > z D such that for Z < z D goods are not produced, goods Z > z D will be sold in at least the domestic market, and goods Z > z X will be sold in both markets. For …rms for which the managerial e¢ ciency costs abroad are su¢ ciently low, ie. 1 there will be at least some products for which multinational production is optimal. We henceforth assume that the support of distribution of …rm ine¢ ciencies is such that this condition is meant. Speci…cally, we assume that the upper bound of the support of international ine¢ ciency satis…es 1 > . 13 It follows immediately that there exists an additional cuto¤, z M > z X , such that goods Z > z M will be produced (and sold) in both countries.
Given the existence of the three cuto¤s z D < z X < z M that de…ne the sets D , X , and M , we may use equations (15) , (14) to rewrite (12) as
where the function B is now written
The …rst order conditions for pro…t maximization associated with (16) imply the following expressions for the three cuto¤s:
To complete the characterization of a …rm's choices, we integrate (17) using the Pareto distribution and substitute the cuto¤s (18), (19) , and (20) to obtain:
where a (1 )=( 1) > 1 is a bundle of parameters and
is an index of the various costs facing a …rm that varies with …rms' foreign managerial ine¢ ciency, . As managerial foreign ine¢ ciency rises, ( ) falls. By substituting (21) into the cuto¤ equations (18)- (20), we obtain reduced form expressions for each cuto¤. We will use these expressions in the following section to analyze the cross-…rm structure of international production.
The Firm-Level Structure of Production
In this section, we map the …rm decisions into measures of …rm-level aggregates that correspond to objects that we measure in the empirical section of the paper. Most derivations and the proof of proposition 3 can be found in the appendix. We begin by analyzing the level of …rm sales by destination and production location of a …rm of type (T; ). The level of sales by the parent …rm in the domestic market for a good of productivity Z is given by
is the solution to (13) . Aggregate sales are then found by integrating over the range of these sales, we …nd
where e A (A)
is an alternative measure of demand. When managerial expertise is important (i.e. > 0), costs that a¤ect international markets have an indirect e¤ect on the level of sales in the domestic market because of the intra-…rm resource allocation e¤ect. Similarly, parent …rm export sales are given by
and the sales of foreign a¢ liates are given by
The following proposition follows directly from inspection of expressions (23), (25), and (26).
Proposition 1 (Absolute Advantage) An increase in a …rm's endowment of managerial expertise, T , increases the …rm's domestic sales, export sales, and local a¢ liate sales.
Firm that have higher levels of managerial expertise allocate more of this expertise to all modes of international commerce. In a sense, it is as if they have higher "core productivity" as in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011). For any given good Z, an increase in core productivity raises the sales of that good and makes it more likely that the good will be produced by the …rm. This result is consistent with the empirical fact in section 2: parent …rms with larger domestic sales have a larger value of aggregate export sales and multinational sales by foreign market.
We now decompose a …rm's parent sales into its scale (local sales per product or its intensive margin) and its scope (number of products managed or its extensive margin) and explore the manner in which a …rm's type is revealed by these observable characteristics. We begin with the parent …rm's scope. A parent …rm's scope (number of products produced) is measured in the model as the share of product categories above the domestic production cuto¤: N (T; ) = (z D ) . Using (18) and (21), we …nd that
As shown in the appendix, a parent …rm's domestic scale is
Inspection of (27) and (28) establishes the following proposition that summarizes the relationship between a …rm's type and the parent scale and scope.
Proposition 2 (Scale and scope) A …rm's scale is independent of T and increasing in . A …rm's scope is increasing in both T and .
The proposition shows us how to perceive variation in a …rm's type from its scale and scope. A parent …rm's scale, an observable …rm characteristic, is driven entirely by variation in its comparative advantage managing production in the home country. The intuition for this result is as follows. An increase in T leads …rms to add more managerial resources to its existing portfolio and to expand into weaker products, which shows up as an increase in scope. As these products have smaller sales than the average product sold previously, the Pareto parameterization of product-level productivity requires that the within-…rm extensive and intensive margins cancel out (as in Chaney, 2008) leaving average sales per product unchanged. Now consider the e¤ect of an increase in . This shift induces the …rm to allocate managerial expertise away from expertise-intensive multinational operations toward domestic production. The resulting impact on the …rm's domestic operations is similar to that of an increase in T . There is, however, an additional e¤ect. As the share of foreign sales shifts toward exports, more managerial resources are allocated to this end. Because the plants that produce for export also produce for the domestic market, the productivity of these export plants rises, lowering the cost of selling in the domestic market and raising the average size of domestic operations.
We now turn our attention from …rms'absolute advantages to …rms' comparative advantages. We start the discussion by focusing our attention on the composition of a …rm's foreign sales as represented by the ratio of the …rm's aggregate export to its local a¢ liate sales, which obtain by dividing (25) by (26):
where e k k(1 ). This expression should be very familiar to readers of Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) . In the special case in which managerial time is unnecessary for production ( = 0) this expression simpli…es to the industry-level expression found in Helpman et al (2004) . This shows how the Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) framework, naturally extended as in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) , delivers within …rm expansion strategies that are identical both within-…rms and across industries! In general, equation (29) shows that a …rm's endowment of managerial expertise, T , has no impact on S X (T; )=S M (T; ). Given the Pareto parameterization, an increase in T causes the cuto¤s Z M and Z X to shift down with the implication that both types of sales rise by exactly the same proportion. As variation in T plays the role of core productivity in Bernard et al (2011), it follows that this type of mechanism does not determine the composition of commerce at the …rm level: simple selection driven models do not deliver variation in the within-…rm composition of commerce that we demonstrated exists in section 2.
One might propose that …rms di¤er in the the degree of productivity dispersion across industry, i.e. that lower k might be a feature of particular types of …rms. If so, a model without scarce managerial resources within the …rm is unnecessary to explain the facts in the empirics section.
While this does indeed generate the proposed e¤ect on S X =S M as can be seen from (29), the following proposition shows that in a model without scarce managerial resources, increased dispersion within the …rm is not consistent with the data (proof is in appendix).
Proposition 3 Suppose that = 0 so that managerial expertise is irrelevant. An increase in within-…rm heterogeneity (lower e ) increases the multinational sales relative to exports and increases both the domestic sales of the same …rm and the number of varieties sold in the domestic market.
Intuitively, increasing within-…rm productivity dispersion increases the mass of activity above an given cuto¤ value. This is precisely the point made in Helpman et al (2004) . Hence, as productivity becomes more dispersed within the …rm, more of the productivity draws exceed the domestic productivity cuto¤ raising both domestic sales and the number of products sold in the domestic market. As this runs counter to the facts demonstrated in section 2, we turn to the comparative advantage mechanism in our model.
A quick glance at equation (29) con…rms that comparative advantage within the …rm, across markets plays the role one would expect. The greater the di¢ culty that a …rm has in providing managerial inputs to its a¢ liate, the higher the export to multinational production ratio will be. The next proposition, which follows from inspection of equations (27), (28), and (29), shows that the managerial expertise mechanism in the model is consistent with the empirics shown in section 2.
Proposition 4
Holding …xed …rms' absolute managerial expertise T , …rms that have di¢ culty communicating abroad (high ) sell a wider range of goods in their domestic market (scope), have larger sales per product in the domestic market (scale) and tend to serve foreign markets through exports rather than a¢ liate sales.
The mechanism giving rise to these e¤ects is intuitive. When a …rm chooses not to open many foreign plants because it is relatively costly to do so, it frees up managerial resources that can be used to raise the productivity of marginal domestic plants. As a result, parent …rms expand domestically by increasing both their product scale and their product scope. Hence, the model can generate the facts described in section 2 both in terms of absolute levels of sales across modes (Proposition 1), and in terms of the relationship between domestic levels and the relative mode choice by …rms in international markets (Proposition 4).
Free Entry
Using the results from the previous sections, we can …nally compute the pro…ts of a …rm of type (T; ):
where e A is given by (24) . Let the joint distribution of …rm types be given by H(T; ) with joint probability density h(T; ) the free entry condition can then be written
Trade Liberalization and Intra-Firm Productivity
In this section, we consider a few simple comparative static exercises to illustrate the workings of the model. First, we consider the e¤ect of a reduction in trade frictions between countries, which corresponds to an increase in . Second, we consider a decrease in the …xed cost of opening a foreign a¢ liate F I . Our focus is on the novel aspect of this model that a change in the economic environment alters the within-…rm allocation of scarce managerial expertise. All proofs are in the appendix.
The intra-…rm productivity e¤ects work through the mechanisms in (13) and (14) . For instance, a reduction in trade cost (increase in ) has a direct impact on the allocation of time within a …rm by causing a reallocation of managerial resources toward exported goods. Because managerial resources are in limited supply within the …rm there is also an impact on all goods that works through changes in B. Allocating more resources to exported goods necessarily reduces the amount of resources available to all other goods. Further, to the extent that the change in the external environment causes …rms to switch modes for individual products (changes in the cuto¤s z D , z X , and z M ) this too will have an impact on the resources available to any individual good.
We begin by showing that the model shares in common with standard models of heterogeneous multiproduct …rms that a reduction in international friction leads to a rationalization e¤ect within the …rm.
Proposition 5 An increase in the freeness of trade, , or a reduction in the …xed cost of investing abroad,F I , reduces the product range of all …rms.
A reduction in an international friction has a push and pull e¤ect on the resource allocation within the …rm. First, as international frictions get less intense, the free entry condition requires that the mark-up adjusted demand level A must fall, and this discourages the production of marginal goods within the …rm. The same reduction in trade frictions will also encourage a reallocation of managerial resources away from goods that produced exclusively for the domestic market toward goods that are sold in the foreign market.
We now focus our attention on the within …rm productivity e¤ects of a reduction in trade costs (a rise in trade freeness ). We summarize the e¤ects of trade and multinational production liberalization through its e¤ect on the productivity of individual goods within the …rm de…ned as '(Z) = Zt(Z)
e . We begin with the following intermediate result:
Lemma 1: An increase in trade freeness, , causes at least some products produced by a …rm to switch from not being exported to being exported.
At least some of the goods that were previously produced in both the domestic and foreign market will have their production rationalized to being exported from a domestic plant. It is also possible that some products will that were previously sold exclusively in the domestic market will also begin to be exported. What happens to the productivity of plants that have switched from not exporting? The following proposition establishes this productivity e¤ect.
Proposition 6
The productivity of a plant that switches from not exporting its product to exporting its product after an increase in trade freeness rises.
Products that switch from not being exported to being exported must see their productivity rise both relative to other goods in the …rm's portfolio and in absolute terms. This is consistent with the empirical results of Lileeva and Tre ‡er (2009), who show that Canadian plants that switch from domestic only to export become more productive. What is novel about our approach is that the e¤ect is not due to increase R&D but to the fact that managers reallocate managerial expertise within the …rm. Once a …rm consolidates the production of a good in one location for two markets the plant producing that good receives a higher proportion of the managerial resources available to the …rm. If the push of managerial resources out of other activities such as marginally productive goods sold exclusively in the domestic market is su¢ ciently strong, then the productivity of all goods must rise.
We now turn our attention to the productivity at the …rm level rather than at the level of the individual product line. The following proposition considers the e¤ect of a reduction in variable trade costs, or an increase in the freeness of trade.
Proposition 7 There exists a cuto¤ level of domestic comparative advantage, b < such that for all …rms with < b the productivity of all goods produced by the …rm increases while for > b the productivity of all non-exported goods falls.
The absolute productivity e¤ects at the …rm level of an increase in trade freeness depends on the …rm's initial orientation toward the foreign market. If the …rm has a high comparative cost advantage producing in the domestic market for export (i.e. > b ), then many of its managerial resources will be allocated toward exporting already. In such a case the pull of the export market leads to such a large reallocation of managerial resources out of non-exported goods that the productivity of non-exported goods ultimately falls. If the …rm exports relatively few products, then the fall in the mark-up adjusted demand level A brought about by the increase in trade freeness drives managerial resources out of marginal plants, and this release of managerial resources dominates the pull of resources toward exported products. The net result is an increase in the productivity of remaining plants.
The asymmetric e¤ect of a change in the international environment across …rms also appears when we consider the e¤ect of a reduction in the …xed cost of engaging in multinational production as the following proposition makes clear.
Proposition 8 Consider a reduction in the …xed cost of international operations, F
I . There exists a e < such that for …rms of type < e the productivity of all goods decreases and for …rms of type > e the productivity of all goods increases.
Unlike an increase in the freeness of trade, a reduction in the …xed cost of international operations has no direct e¤ect on the allocation of managerial time across goods. Two indirect e¤ects are at work. First, there is a tendency for …rms to substitute on the margin multinational production for exports. While less managerial resources are allocated to any one plant for a switching good, collectively the two plants require more managerial resources than a single plant. This tends to take managerial resources away from other goods (dispersion e¤ect). Second, as noted above, the marginal domestic plant closes as the mark-up adjusted demand level falls making more managerial resources available for remaining plants (consolidation e¤ect). Firms with a strong comparative advantage producing in their domestic market ( > e ) will see their productivity increase as the consolidation e¤ect outweighs the dispersion e¤ect while the opposite is true for the remaining …rms.
Conclusion
The key feature of multiproduct …rms is that they internalize the e¤ects of decisions directed toward one set of goods on the outcomes of another set of goods. The types of e¤ects that are internalized can either be on the product market side (e.g. cannibalization e¤ects) or on the production side. The focus of this paper has been squarely on the latter. We have shown that when managerial expertise is a scarce resource in the …rm (as in Lucas 1977 and Rosen 1982) , that the decision of how many goods to produce, where to produce them (export versus FDI), and for which markets to produce become inter-related.
Several important insights emerge from our analysis. First, we show that considering the internalization e¤ects of managerial time provides insight into the standard "proximity-concentration" model. An important bene…t to consolidating production in a single location is that managerial resources are conserved, which allows the …rm to produce the same set of goods more e¢ ciently while also producing a wider range of goods.
Second, we have derived a new set of facts on the behavior of large multiproduct …rms that both export and engage in MP in foreign markets and demonstrated that standard proximity-concentration models naively adapted to a multiproduct setting heterogeneity cannot explain these facts. Comparative advantage in domestic versus foreign management across …rms combined with an internal resource constraint within the …rm is consistent with these facts, however.
Third, we have shown how an internal managerial resource constraint leads to within-…rm productivity e¤ects that di¤er substantially from those of purely selection driven models. Changes in the international trading environment a¤ect the way that …rms allocate scarce managerial resources across products with the implication that some …rms will appear to become more productive as they narrow their product range and concentrate production in fewer locations, while other …rms will appear to become less productive as they expand their product range and allocate more resources to foreign production.
There are several natural extensions to the model. First, by adding additional countries one can generate export platform multinational production that provides a …rm with the bene…t of conserving scarce managerial expertise relative to replicating production in many locations. Second, by adding idiosyncratic di¤erences in demand across countries and products, it becomes possible to generate a number of new outcomes such as the same …rm exporting "both ways"between two countries. Third, if individual goods within a …rm's product portfolio receive a productivity shock that leads the …rm to introduce a previously dor-mant product, then the …rm may drop a previously produced product line (or vice versa). This means that the model can be used to explain the product churn that has been documented in the literature.
Finally, an area that we have not explored in this paper, but which would be a fruitful subject of further analysis would be to consider how the allocation of scarce managerial time within the …rm could be combined with contractional frictions as in Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004) . In the latter, in any given industry there is an e¢ cient contracting con…guration that all …rms would choose to adopt but for …xed costs associated with that mode. In the setting considered here, another bene…t of outsourcing that could conserve on managerial expertise but which might come at the cost of a reduction in incentives. Such an extension would help to bring a wider array of international commerce into a single framework. As noted in the text, the de…nition of domestic sales is S D (T; ) =
where t(Z) was derived in (13) . Substituting for the allocation of managerial expertise, we have
Integrating using the Pareto distribution, we obtain
Now substituting for the cuto¤s using (18) , (19) , and (20) , and de…ning a = e =( 1), we obtain Substituting for the cuto¤s we obtain
Reorganizing this expression yields parent …rm scale, which is equation (28) in the text. Finally, substituting for z D using (18) and substituting out B using (21), we obtain (23).
Export Sales
The de…nition of export sales is
, where t(Z) was derived in (13) . Substituting for the allocation of managerial time we obtain
Integrating using the Pareto distribution yields
Applying the appropriate cuto¤ conditions (19) and (20), we obtain
Finally, substituting for B using (21), we obtain (25).
Local A¢ liate Sales
The de…nition of aggregate multinational sales is
dG(Z) where t(Z) was derived in (13) . Following the same steps as above we obtain
Proof of Proposition 3
Setting = 0, the expression for domestic sales (23) simpli…es to
where we have written sales as a function of a because we have put all …rm heterogeneity into this variable. Note that a decrease in a is associated with an increase in dispersion across goods within an industry. Taking the logarithms of this expression we obtain log S D (a) = log + log(a) log(a 1) + a log(A) + (1 a) log F Now di¤erentiating, we obtain
1 we have dS D (a)=da < 0. So an increase in dispersion must raise local sales.
Free Entry Condition Derivation
From (16) pro…ts are de…ned as
Substitute for the Pareto Distribution to obtain
Substitute for the cuto¤s using (18)- (20) to obtain
Using the de…nition of B, solving for ( ), and substituting the resultant expression, this can be simpli…ed to
Now, substitute for B and simplify to obtain
Combining these (16) and (31), we obtain
As our model delivers no extensive margin across …rms by abstracting from on-going corporate …xed costs, this parameter never changes in any comparative statics.
Proof of Proposition 5
The least productive good produced by a …rm is given by equation (18) . Let a prime denote the value of a variable after a reduction in an international friction. We have
Neither trade or MP friction enters this expression, so all the e¤ects work through the endogenous variables AB . Using the de…nition of B given by (21) we …nd
Note that if this variable falls with a reduction in international frictions, then the cuto¤ rises as we now show. Let primed variables be the values after a trade or MP liberalization. It is immediate from our parameter restrictions that ( ) 0 > ( ) for all …rms. Using the free entry condition (31), we obtain 
So either type of liberalization lowers the mark-up adjusted demand level. Thus, we have
The cuto¤ for operating a good for all …rms must rise.
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the ratio of cuto¤s z M =z D . Using the cuto¤ de…nitions (18) and (20), we have
An increase in trade freeness raises directly, and by proposition 5 raises z D thus at least some goods that were previous produced in both locations (and thus not exported) become exported.
Proof of Proposition 6
For a small change in the freeness of trade there are two types of goods that could switch from not being exported to being exported. First there are goods that were not sold abroad at all (Z near z X ). Second, there are goods that were sold abroad through a multinational a¢ liate (see Lemma 1) whose production is rationalized with an increase in the freeness of trade (Z near z M ). Let a prime indicate the value of a variable after a change, the change in managerial resources allocated to any plant that only served the domestic market before the rise in trade freeness is
There are two possibilities. First, B falls. In this case, the time allocated to all remaining plants must rise including those that are exported. Second, B might rise so that B=B 0 < 1. In this case, equations (13) shows that all goods that are not exported must have fewer managerial resources allocated to them. The change in t(Z) for an incumbent ; which is strictly less than for a good that has switched from non-exporting to exporting. Hence, as some goods must have more managerial resources allocated so that resource allocation constraint binds, it must be that the productivity of switchers rises.
Proof of Proposition 7
As made clear by (13) if an economic shock lowers the managerial time burden B then the productivity of all incumbent products must increase. We start by di¤erentiating (21) with respect to to obtain From this expression we note that (a 1)(1 ) a < 1 so that there must be some …rms for whom dBd > 0. Note also that @ ( )=@ > 0. This means that there must be a b < such that for all > b , dB=d > 0 and for < b , dB=d < 0. It may be that b < 1 in which case dB=d > 0 for all …rms. For the …rms with above this cuto¤, the productivity of non-export goods will fall.
Proof of Proposition 8
As made clear by (13) if an economic shock lowers the managerial time burden B then the productivity of all incumbent products must increase. We start by di¤erentiating (21) Note that the inequality follows from the fact that a > 1. Next, totally di¤erentiate the zero pro…t condition (31) to obtain From this expression we note two things. First, (a 1)(1 ) a < 1 and so there must exist some …rms for whom an increase in F I lowers B. Second, note that @ ( )=@ > 0. It then follows that there must exist a e < such that for all > e , dB=dF I > 0 and for < e , dB=dF I < 0, and it may be that e < 1 in which case dB=dF I > 0 for all …rms. Hence, a reduction in F I will make B fall for > e , increasing productivity of all goods, and increase B for < e , lowering the productivity of all goods. 
